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A. Introduction 
In 1986 the Royal Commission on the Electoral System published its report, 
Tmo11rds 11 Beffer Demorr11cy, recommending the adoption of the Mixed Member 
Proportional system of voting for the House of Representatives. This has been 
effected with the passing of the Electoral Act 1993. However, the Royal 
Commission also recommended that the provisions covered by section 189 of the 
Electoral Act 1956, now section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993, be protected 
against amendment or repeal other than by the special procedures set down in 
the Act, and that "[t]he protecting provision should itself be protected in the 
"1 same way ... 
This recommendation has not yet been effected. The reserved provisions of the 
Electoral Act 1993 cover matters fundamental to our system of Parliamentary 
democracy, yet constitutional conventions remain the only impediment to their 
amendment or repeal by an ordinary Parliamentary majority. Ultimately, the 
people of New Zealand are being asked to trnst the present incumbents of the 
House of Representatives to ensure that our political system will not be altered 
beyond recognition. It would not be too much to suggest that the people of New 
Zealand are being asked to repose a great deal of trust in a body which lately has 
not demonstrated its trustworthiness. 
A significant body of public opinion would now accept that certain matters, 
namely those things essential to the preservation of our political system, be 
placed beyond the political fracas. Such matters are so important that it should 
only be possible to alter them with widespread public and political support. 
Indeed, the protection of our political system from ordinary political 
manipulation is overdue and, rather than asking why, we should perhaps ask why 
not. 
1 
Report of the Royal Commis\ion on the Electoral ~yqem 7owards a Beller Demorrary (Covernment 
Printer, Wellington, 1986) 292. 
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B. 
PARTI 
THE VALIDITY OF ENTRENCHMENT 
Parliamentary Sovereignty 
It is a well-established doctrine of constitutional law tl1,1t P,1rliament is sovereign. 
The classic expression of this jurisprudenti,11 concept m,1y be found in Dicey's An 
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution:
2 
The principle of P,1rli,1mentary Sovereignty means neither more nor less th,1t 
this, namely, that P,1rliament thus defined [ie . .QJ.1ee11, Lords a11d Commom] h,1s, under 
the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever; and, 
further, that no person or body is recognised by the l,1w of England as having a 
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 
The fullest measure of Parliamentary Sovereignty was to be found tn the 
P,1rliament at Westminster. Of this body, the courts st,1ted: 
1 
The Legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the form 
of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a 
subsequent statute dealing with the same subject matter there can be no implied 
repeal. If in a subsequent Act, Parliament chooses to make it plain that the earlier 
statute is being to some extent repealed, effect must be given to that intention just 
because it is the will of the Legislature. 
Under this traditional interpretation, neither substantive nor procedural 
restrictions on the legislative power of Parliament could be of any effect. 
Namely, " ... a sovereign Parliament cannot limit its sovereignty."
4 
C. Effect of section 268 
Section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993 reserves certain provisions from ,1lteration 
other tl1,1n by a speci,11 majority or ,1 referendum. Yet the protection afforded by 
2 A V Dicey An lntroductwn to the Study of the law of the Comlttullon (MacMill.i.n & Co. Ltu., Lonuon, 
1960) 40. 
3 I:lfen Street fat ates v Minister of I lealth I 1934 I I KB 590, 597. 
4 A Bill ofR1ghtsjor New7..ealand:A White Paper(l985) AJI IR 1, A.6: p.i.r,1 7.9. 
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section 268 is illusory. The ordinary machinery of Parliament may be used to 
avoid its restrictions. 
The problem arises as section 268 is not itself protected against amendment or 
repeal in the ordinary manner. Parliament could remove section 268 by a simple 
majority, and the so-called 'reserved' provisions could then amended or repealed 
in the same manner. 
That section 268 may be sufficient to preclude an implied repeal of the sections 
covered is the most one could argue. However, even this may be going too far. 
When the original Act was passed Parliament did not entrench section 189 of the 
1956 Act because it was felt this was legally impossible. Parliament could only 
hope to achieve a political or moral constraint on amendment. 
P A Joseph argues that section 189 (now section 268) has conventional force. s 
The question of amending section 189 by a simple majority arose with the 
proposed 'Shirtcliffe Amendment' to the Electoral Reform Bill.
6 Commentators 
argued that it would be "constih1tionally improper" to amend section 189 other 
than by the set procedures.
7 The propriety of amending section 189 by a simple 
majority was avoided when the proposal was abandoned. Whatever the 
constih1tionality of amending section 189 by a simple majority, section 189 
provides no legal protection to its amendment:
8 
[A] Government exploiting the single entrenchment under the Electoral Act 
must accept full political responsibility, as the price of it amending an entrenched 
section. The sanction would be political accountability. ... The discipline of 
pragmatic politics imposes sufficient self-regulation, whatever further argument may 
be made for a constitutional convention. 
There are only two possible interpretations that can be placed on section 268. 
Either it is legally ineffective ab initio and places no restraint whatsoever on 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. This approach would conform with the traditional 
5 PA Jo eph "Constitution.ii Entrenchment ,rnd MMP" (199-1) New /.ea/and Unmersitus /.aw Rw ,em 67, 
78. 
6 Thc 'Shirtcliffe Amendment,' .idvoc.ited by the C.impaign for Beller Government spoke\person Peter 
Shirtcliffe in 1993, would have required an ;ibsolute m,ijo rity of registered elel tor\ in favour of the MMP 
propm,il, not simply a m,ijority of votes (d\l. 
1 c; P,ilmer "Dcmocratil b,iscline must <,t.iy" The Domm1on, Wellington, New Zeal.ind, 4 Augu<,t 1993, 8. 
8 Above n .'i, 80. 
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D. 
view of Parliamentary Sovereignty as expressed in Ellen Street Estates.q Therefore, 
implied repeal by a later Act of any of the matters covered by section 268 would 
be effective:10 
Section 189 was singly entrenched. It lacked the protection of its own 
procedures and could have been altered by ordinary Act of Parliament .... 
If section 189 was susceptible to ordinary legislation, then its amendment would 
seem possible even by implication under the doctrine of implied repeal. What can 
be done expressly can be done by implication. This doctrine applies 
notwithstanding the importance of constitutional amendment. 
The alternative is that section 268 is effective in so far as it precludes an implied 
repeal and requires Parliament to either conform to the protecting provisions or 
engage in a two-step legislative process. 
If the second interpretation is advocated, then it is submitted that this constitutes 
a genuine restriction of the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. If 
one advocates this position, there is no logical reason for arguing that provisions 
cannot be genuinely entrenched. In supporting section 268, one has already 
conceded that Parliamentary Sovereignty may be limited. Whether a provision is 
singly or doubly entrenched is merely a matter of degree. 
Developments tn New Zealand 
1. Sunset on the Empire 
As the full plenitude of parliamentary powers was to be found at Westminster, it 
was by this standard that the powers of other legislatures, including New 
Zealand's, were to be measured. This does not mean that the powers of the New 
Zealand Parliament necessarily derive from Westminster; New Zealand possesses a 
fully sovereign and independent legislature. By 1947, with the Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act, and certainly by 1973 with the New Zealand 
Constitution Amendment Act 1973, the New Zealand Parliament claimed to 
possess full powers, equal in extent to those enjoyed by the Parliament at 
Q Above n 3. 
10 Above n 5, 73. 
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Westminster. The Constitution Act 1986 simply stated that "[t]he Parliament of 
New Zealand continues to have full power to make laws."
11 At this time, it was 
felt that New Zealand possessed a fully sovereign legislature, subject to all the 
strictures of Diceyan perceptions of Parliamentary Sovereignty:
12 
... English constitutional theory received into New Zealand holds the New 
Zealand Parliament to be sovereign. ~estions concerning the validity of 
legislation do not arise - whatever is enacted is law. This places New Zealand 
alongside the United Kingdom as possessing illimitable and perpetual powers of 
law-making. 
To say that the powers of the New Zealand Parliament are to be measured against 
those of Westminster does not imply any sort of floating scale; merely that 
parliamentary sovereignty is a jurisprudential model developed within the 
Westminster system. Under this model, the powers of the Westminster 
Parliament represent the apogee of parliamentary power. A fully sovereign 
Parliament, as is the New Zealand Parliament, possesses powers equal in extent to 
those of Westminster. It would be absurd to suggest that the New Zealand 
Parliament, under this Diceyan model of parliamentary sovereignty, enjoys 
powers greater the institution which the model itself defines as having the fullest 
plenitude of power, that is, the Westminster Parliament. 
TI1e importance of this assertion is that if the powers of the institution which the 
model defines as possessing the fullest extent of parliamentary sovereignty 
undergo a change, then the understanding of parliamentary sovereignty under the 
model must itself be reconsidered. If the definitive model (ie. Westminster) is 
able to place restrictions on its law-making powers, then one must accept that the 
model itself admits of such restrictions. 
Since the United Kingdom joined the European Community in 1972, the 
understanding of the sovereignty of the Parliament at Westminster has 
undergone considerable change. It is now accepted that the provisions of the 
11 Con5titution Act 1986, 5 17(1) 
1' P /\Joseph & G R W.ilker ~A Theory of Constitutional Ch.inge~ (1987) 7 04iJTd./ournal of Lega/ Studies 
155, 156. 
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European Communities Act 1972 do impose an effective procedural restriction 
on the powers of its successor Parliaments.
13 
This shift in the Westminster paradigm must impact on New Zealand 
d d. f 1· . 14 un erstan mgs o par 1amentary sovereignty. As the definitive institution of 
parliamentary powers, it is not now possible to suggest that valid procedural 
restrictions may not be placed on the law-making powers of the New Zealand 
Parliament when they may be validly placed on those of Westminster. It remains 
to be decided how such restrictions may be validly achieved, but one must admit 
their possibility. 
This new understanding of parliamentary sovereignty does not entail a loss of 
parliamentary power. For the European Communities Act 1972 to be effective, it 
is necessary to admit that powers to entrench exist in the United Kingdom 
constitution, and have always done so. So too in New Zealand. By stating that 
procedural entrenchment is valid, we are not asserting any novel power. It is a 
power that was always implicit in the parliamentary sovereignty model. 
2. The Sovereignty discourse 
The tenor of recent legal scholarship indicates an acceptance of restrictions on 
Pa rlia men ta ry sovereignty. 
P A Joseph and G R Walker advance a theory of a retreat from parliamentary 
sovereignty, resulting largely from concerns with actions of the Muldoon 
government. 1
5 This retreat manifests itself in the utterances of varied members 
of the political and legal establishment, most notably in the dicta of Sir Robin 
Cooke.16 Even if one rejects the argument that the power to impose restrictions 
on the law-making powers Parliament is not inherent in the constitution, Joseph 
13 Sec pdra [ bt:low. 
14 See B V I l.uri5 "P,irliamcnt.uy Sovereignty and Interim lnjunltions: lwtortame ,1nd New Zealand" 
(1992) 15 New 7..ealand Uni11ersifltes law Rwiew 55. I J.uris notes th.it the I louse of Lorch has implicitly 
acceptcc.l that the law-making powers of Parliament are not immut,1ble. I le suggests that I actort,ime will 
t:nable .in international agreement incorporated into c.l omestic law to be cdpable of overric.ling future 
conflicting statutes (p 63). Such a rult: coulc.l bccomt: cruiLially important to New Zeal,inc.l shoulc.l C l'R 
develop into a wpra-national leg.ii system. 
15 Above n 12. 
16 S , cc par a 1)(3). 
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and Walker provide support for a more dynamic reading of our constitution, a 
constitution which possesses the ability to adapt itself to the changing tides of 
public will. The New Zealand constitution is moving from a 'continuing' to a 
'self-embracing' theory of Parliamentary sovereignty.
17 The scope and speed of 
these changes are not to be found in legal discourse but "must draw upon wider 
phenomena than judicial convention or definitive jurispmdential argmnent."
18 
Similarly J B Elkind argues that entrenchment, although possible, would "involve 
a massive shift of responsibility between the legislature and the judiciary."
1
Q 
Ultimately, whether New Zealand opts for entrenchment, and whether the courts 
will enforce entrenching provisions is a political, not a legal, decision:
20 
It is political truth that, in the New Zealand system, judges regard themselves as 
bound to interpret and apply Acts of Parliament. It is political truth that New 
Zealand judges and constitutional lawyers have traditionally adhered to a strict 
Diceyan approach to Parliamentary Sovereignty.... In the end, when we discard 
theological speculation, theoretical dispute and semantic confusion, the question 
whether legislation can be effectively entrenched comes down to "what will the 
judges do?" or "what can they be induced to do?" 
Elkind does not believe any of the Commonwealth cases may be used to support 
a theory of self-embracing sovereignty in an uncontrolled constitution, but avoids 
this legal problem by postulating a political solution. A shift in New Zealand's 
constitutional paradigm to permit entrenchment is possible, but only through a 
clear political movement: "It will be revolution in which the reluctant judicial 
vanguard will be mustered only by a faltering trumpet."
21 
B V Harris looks to Westminster to support the validity of entrenchment. In 
1984, he argued that the powers of the New Zealand Parliament could be fettered 
neither in substance nor in form.
22 However, he regards these powers as too 
wide in a unicameral system, and suggests the adoption of a written constitution. 
17 
Above n 12, 169. 
18 
Above n 12, 171. 
1QJ B Elkind "A New look at Entrenchment" (1987) 50 Modern l.aw Rwiew 158, 174. 
Jo Alxwe n 19, 175. 
JI Above n 19, 175. 
n B V I larri~ "The Law-making Powers of the New Zealand Ceneral A\\emhly: time to think about 
change" (1984) 5 Otago I aw Rwiew 565. 
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The first method he advanced, enactment by the Westminster Parliament, is no 
longer possible after 1986. The other two methods employed the device of a new 
legislature, acting under a new constitution. Such a document would gain 
legitimacy by its approval in a nc1tionwide referendum.
23 Harris therefore shares 
with Cooke P d perception that were Parliament's powers to be limited, the limits 
would need to enjoy widespread public support. 
While it was felt in 1955 that double entrenchment would be ineffective,
2
,, few 
such fears were present in 1993. The Justice Department submission on the Bill 
recommended that section 268 not be doubly entrenched because it was 
considered unnecessary. That Parliament would have the power to entrench the 
provisions if it so chose was not an issue.
25 
The most recent New Zealand legal scholarship on this point supports the 
validity of restrictions on Parliament's law-making powers, at least in so far as 
h 1 d 1 · · 26 t ey amount on y to proce ura restnct1ons: 
The rules which define Parliament on the one hand, and its powers on the 
other, are distinct. Parliament may, by legislation, validly reconstitute itself or 
reformulate its legislative procedures, but it cannot alter the rules affecting area of 
power. Statutes for the former purposes bind Parliament, those for imposing 
legislative vacuums do not. 
Joseph also argues that precedent for the validity of procedural restrictions can be 
found in the Electoral Acts. Section 189 of the Electoral Act 1956 became 
accepted by the political and legal fraternity as binding. Although not legally 
binding, there would be now be no impediment to making it so.
27 
3. Sir Robin Cooke and fundamental rights 
Between 1979 and 1984, Sir Robin Cooke, the current President of the Court of 
Appeal, uttered a series of dicta which John Caldwell termed "amongst the most 
13 
Above n 22, 600. 
14 
Above n 4. 
15 
Department of Justile Uectoral Rejorm Bill.· Report of the Department o//11st1u (1993) J/ 11, p 80. 
16 
PA Joseph Constitutional and /ldmmistrat111e J,aw m New ha/and (The L,iw Book Co. Ltd, Sydney, 1993) 
460. ee .ilso G Pamkr New 7Laland's Const1t11twn in Crisis Oohn Mdndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 38. 
11 
Above n 5, 81. 
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E. 
breath-taking dirta ever propounded by a New Zealand Judge."
28 Sir Robin 
speculated that there may be Common Law rights beyond the power of 
Parliament. Two later cases raise the issue that limits to Parliamentary sovereignty 
may be found in the Treaty of Waitangi.
2
Q 
In a legal system traditionally holding to Diceyan doctrines of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, such suggestions are somewhat novel. However, their impact should 
not be exaggerated. The comments in the cases are merely dirttl. With the 
exception of torture,
3° Cooke's comments have merely expressed doubts as to 
Parliament's power. And, he has not repeated the comments since 1984. 
However, the dirta are significant in that they are indicative of growing 
reservations to accept notions of unfettered parliamentary power.
31 They indicate 
that our highest indigenous court may recognise limitations on Parliament's 
powers, be they found in the Common Law or in the provisions of a statute. 
This acceptance of restricted Parliamentary sovereignty is rooted in a climate of 
. . l d l 3? const1h1t1ona eve opment: -
Constitutional meaning does not derive from any single utterance from within 
the interpretive community; rather it derives from the consensus and uniformity of 
statements emerging from this community. We have recorded statements made by 
two senior judges, New Zealand's first Ombudsman, a former legal academic (now 
Minister of Justice), an editorial writer, a former Member of Parliament, and a 
cross-section of the legal profession. Numerous similar statements appear in legal 
periodicals and the popular media. Coupled with Cooke J's judicial dicta, these 
expressions form part of a constellation of statements on the New Zealand 
constitution indicating prescriptive constitutional change. 
Developments at Westminster 
28 J L Caldwell "Judie id] Sovereignty - d new view" [ 1984] New /..ea/and Iaw/ournal 357. ·1 he la\e\ in 
whid1 the\e dicta .ire contained .ire: '/'aylor v New 7..ea/and Poultry Board 119841 1 NZ! R 394, 398; haser v 
Sr are Semices Commission f 1984 I 1 NZI R 116, 121; New 7..ea/and Dri'llers //ssouarion v New /.ea/and Road 
Ca"iers 11982] 1 NZlR 374,390; Brader v MiniJtry of Transport 1198111 NZI R 73, 78; / v M [1979] 2 
NZLR 519, 527. 
JQ Te Rzmanga O Wharekauri re Kohu Incorporated v Attorney-Genera! & ors Unreported, 3 November 1993, 
Court of Appeal, CA 297 / 92; New 7..ealand Maori Counal v /llforney-(,'eneral 119871 1 NZl R 641. 
.lo Taylor v New 7..ealand Poultry /3oard, above n 28 . 
. l! Above n 12, 167. 
1
' Above n 12, 166-167. 
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1. European Community Litigation 
The validity of procedural restrictions on the law-making powers of the 
parliament at Westminster is now a Ja;t arrompH. The restrictions imposed by the 
European Communities Act 1972 have been given effect by the British courts. 
It is now accepted that the restrictive provisions of the European Communities 
Act 1972 are effective with respect to subsequent legislation. Indeed, assertions of 
the supremacy of European Community law in the United Kingdom hardly 
cause comment. Much has been written in the UK and elsewhere on the 
Factortaml' Case,33 but the recent decision of the House of Lords in the Equal 
Opportunt"t;es Commission Case goes even further. 
In Equal Opportum"ties Commission v Secretary of State far Employment;'>4 the House of 
Lords issued a declaration that certain provisions of the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978 (UK) were inconsistent with article 119 of the EEC 
Treaty. To some extent, whether a United Kingdom court will set aside an Act of 
Parliament remains an open question, as a declaration was sufficient on the facts. 
After Factortame, the primacy of European Community law raised no dissent 
among the Law Lords: "The EOC is concerned simply to obtain a rnling which 
reflects the primacy of Community law enshrined in section 2 of the 1972 
Act. ... "3s Their Lordships accepted that European Community law would 
invalidate inconsistent national law in so far as it applied to nationals of member 
sta tes.36 
Arguably the Equal Opportunities Commission case goes further than Factortame. 
Factortame related to the availability of Common Law relief under conditions of 
inconsistency with European Community law. The House of Lords held that 
national law concerning available relief must give way to Community law. 
However, it is another matter to say that an inconsistent Act of Parliament must 
give way to Community law. 
3
· 1-actortame /,td. & ors v Secretary of State far Transport (No 2) [ 1991 J 2 All ER 70 (11 L). 
14 [1994] 1 All rn. 910; [1994] 2 WLR 409; [1994] IRI R 176. 
s Above 11 34, 920. 
'6 Above 11 34, 920. 
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Remarkable as the decision in Equal Opportunitfrs Commission is, it 1s equally 
notable for the equanimity with which the statements were made. That the 
House of Lords may state that inconsistent statutes must give way to Community 
law while hardly raising a murmur in doing so, indicates how much perceptions 
of sovereignty have changed. 
2. The retreat from Sovereignty 
English legal scholarship today is also aware of the transformation effected by 
the European Communities Act 1972. The topic attracts articles such as "The 
Undeniable Supremacy of European Community law" in which Emma Chown 
'reconfirms a few home truths.'
37 
Even a jurist of the continuing school of Parliamentary sovereignty, H W R 
Wade admits out of necessity, but, one senses, with some regret, that the United 
Kingdom's sovereignty has been circumscribed by membership of the European 
Community, and that the lesson of the litigation is that "international law, in 
the shape of treaty obligations may help to overthrow the dogmas of 
constitutional law, and ... the courts may discard fundamental doctrine without 
. . ,,3g 
appearing to notice. 
Elizabeth McCaffrey however, continues to maintain that the European 
Communities Act 1972 may be regarded simply as a rnle of construction, and 
not as a limit on Parliamentary sovereignty.
39 Ms McCaffrey overcomes the 
obvious difficulties in such an approach by asserting tl1at tl1e United Kingdom 
courts will "construe statutes intended to fulfil tl1e UK's Treaty obligations in a 
flexible way, so as to give effect to Parliament's intention, even if tl1is means 
. tl . f tl "40 going contrary to 1e apparent meaning o 1e statute. 
11 
[ C hown " 'J he Undeniable Suprem,icy of European Community Law" (1993) New Law Journal 377 . 
.1s I I W R Wade "Wh,it has h.ippened to the Sovcn.:i)!,nty o f P,irli.iment?" (1991) 107 Law .QJ,arterly Rw iew 
I, 4. 
JQ E McC.1ffrey "P.uli,imentary Sovereignty and the Primacy of [ urope,m Liw: A M.itter of Comtruction?" 
(1991) 42 Northern Ireland Le/!,al Quarterly 109. 
40 
Above n 39, 11 9. 
7-
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With respect, Ms McCaffrey's approach strains the limits of statutory 
interpretation. It would surely be more honest, and therefore facilitative of 
justice, were the courts to admit the primacy of European Community law. 
The majority of writers are willing to admit the primacy of European 
Community law, and that notions of sovereignty are fluid and, essentially 
political.41 However, both the writers and the courts admit that the European 
Communities Act 1972 imposes merely a procedural restriction on Parliament's 
law-making powers. Were Parliament to pass an Act which explicitly stated that 
it intends to violate or repudiate a rnle of European Community law, the courts 
would enforce such a provision. However, the passage of such an Act would 
amount to no less than a unilateral repudiation of Britain's membership of the 
E C . '12 uropean ommumty. 
F. Procedural preconditions for entrenchment 
As nerone in New Zealand has yet attempted to genuinely entrench any statutory 
provision, the procedural preconditions for validly doing so, if any, are unclear. 
However, the President of the Court of Appeal has suggested that any entrenched 
provisions must enjoy 'practical sanctity' for the Courts to uphold them:
43 
That is why proponents of a Bill of Rights talk of a referendum or a fully 
representative constitutional conference; or a travelling select committee of the 
House of Representatives; or a virtually unanimous vote of the House. 
The truth is that, in the end, whether guaranteed rights are really fundamental -
able to be overridden only by a spt'cial parliamt'ntary majority or a rt'frrmdum 
dot's not depmd on legal logic. It depends on a value judgmmt by the courts, 
based of their view of the will of tht' people. 
TI1e President's remarks fail to outline any precise criteria, but indicate that any 
successful attempt at entrenchment must enjoy widespread support. However, it 
would be in the interests of certainty for Parliament, if it is to venture down the 
41 
Sec for example, T R S All.rn "The Limit\ of Parli,imcntary Sovereignty" (1985) Pu/;/ir law 614. 
4
' M Akchurst "P,irliamcntary Sovereignty ,md the Suprem,icy of Community Liw" (1989) 60 Bntish 
Yearbook of International Law 351 
4
· Sir Robin Cooke "Practic,1litic5 of a Bill of Rights" I S Dcthbridge Memori,il Address to the M,iritime 
l,,iw Asso<..i<1tion of Au5tralia ,md New Zcal,ind (1984) 112 Counr,/ Bne(4; ,cc aim A B,11 o(R,ghtsfor New 
7.,ea/and,: A White Paper (1985) AJI IR 1, A.6: p.ira 7.18. 
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path of entrenchment, to have a more certain indication of what steps it must 
follow to ensure a successful entrenchment. 
The essential objection to Parliamentary sovereignty has always been that one 
sovereign Parliament purports to bind another, equally sovereign, Parliament. It 
is axiomatic to democracy that each generation enjoys full powers over its own 
existence. However, if one admits that it is possible for one Parliament to 
procedurally fetter its successors, an Act of Parliament could not be challenged as 
undemocratic if it requires no higher standard of successor Parliament than that 
by which it was itself enacted. 
Lest this last statement create more uncertainty than it resolved, I will attempt to 
put this concept into plain English. Despite my support for the validity of 
entrenchment, I agree that there is something intuitively wrong in one generation 
forcing another to jump through legislative hoops which they didn't have to 
jump through themselves. However, my objections are removed if the Parliament 
imposing the procedural restrictions did so as if the restrictions applied to them 
also. For instance, the democratic objection to entrenchment would be removed 
if a provision requiring a 75% majority of the House of Representatives or a 
majority of votes in a nationwide referendum to be amended or repealed was 
itself enacted with the support of either a 75% majority of the House of 
Representatives or a majority of votes in a nationwide referendum. 
If Parliament adopts the approach of passing entrenching legislation with the 
same level of support as is necessary to amend or repeal it, there appears little 
reason to doubt that such legislation would enjoy 'practical sanctity' and would 
be upheld by the courts. 
This approach has been endorsed by the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
S 44 ystem: 
We add, if ir is 11ecessary to do so, that we would see the central proV1s1ons 111 
question as being adopted by the House only in the special way provided, that 1s 
44 Above n I, 292. 
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with the agreement of the major parties represented there or by referendum. [Italics 
mine.] 
PART II 
THE DESIRABILITY OF ENTRENCHMENT 
G. Fundamental Nature of Reserved Provisions 
Of the reserved provisions, the Report of the Justice Department on the Electoral 
Reform Bill stated:'1
5 
We have mixed feelings about the entrenching provisions of the Electoral Act. 
They were devised as a safeguard (by an agreed constitutional understanding) to 
prevent abuses of power (such as gerrymandering) by Governments elected under 
first past the post. These provisions have operated in practice to prevent abuses by 
the Government of the day. On the other hand, the existence of entrenchment 
prov1S1ons can pose a large obstacle to legitimate demands for constitutional 
change .... 
On balance, we would conclude that under MMP entrenching provisions will 
probably be of less significance in preventing gerrymandering and we do not 
accordingly perceive any compelling justification for double entrenchment in the 
present exercise. 
Witl1 respect, one could argue that tl1e reserved provisions, such as the term of 
Parliament, have a wider scope tl1an merely to prevent gerrymandering. The 
Royal Commission on tl1e Electoral System stated that "[t)he argument for 
enhanced protection being required by law is that tl1ese matters are tl1e most 
important of tl10se in the electoral system and that they should be given tl1e 
. l f. f tl ,,'1(, greatest protection on t 1e ace o 1e statute. 
The provisions reserved under section 268 of tl1e Electoral Act 1993 are among 
the most important guarantees of our political system. Section 268 protects tl1e 
term of Parliament; tl1e membership of the Representation Commission, which is 
45 Above n 25, 79-80. 
46 Above.: n 1, 291. 
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responsible for drawing up electoral boundaries; the allowance for the adjustment 
of the quota for electoral districts; the definitions of persons eligible to vote; and 
the method of electing Members of Parliament. 
All of these provisions are fundamental to the preservation of our system of 
parliamentary democracy. Control over the matters covered by section 268 could 
enable a government of the day to manipulate the electorates to suit its own 
political needs, or restrict the franchise. A government of the day could extend 
the term of Parliament to ensure its own survival. It is often said that at the very 
least, the people of New Zealand get to decide who will govern them for the next 
three years. With control over the matters covered section 268, even this final 
instrument of the people's will would be lost. 
It is unacceptable to place such matters before the ordinary legislative procedure 
of Parliament. The powers protected by section 268 must be exercised impartially 
in the best interests of all New Zealanders and in the interests of our democratic 
system. The fundamental nature of the reserved provisions is such that they 
should be amended only when it is absolutely clear that such changes are desired 
by a majority of electors or by the concurrence of a preponderance of the 
Members of Parliament. The endorsement of a political platform at a general 
election cannot indicate support for a particular issue: '1
7 
[T)he electorate's role cannot, in the usual case, be focused on a particular issue. 
A general election is a blunt instrument. It cannot give judgement on particular 
issues. 
Constitutional prov1S1ons of this importance should not be subject to the 
ordinary parliamentary process. 
H Duration of Convention under MMP 
41 
All amendments of the provisions reserved by section 189 of the Electoral Act 
1956 have in fact been passed in accordance with the terms of section 189. In 
real terms, this means that amendments have been passed with the support of the 
Above n 4, para 4.7. 
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Opposition, ie. unanimously. However, although one could assert that a 
convention presently exists that section 189 (or section 268 in the 1993 Act) will 
be observed,48 there is no reason to assume that such a consensus will continue 
under MMP. 
It is likely that MMP will produce a more politically diverse Parliament than 
exists at present. There are already four parties represented in the present 
parliament, and based on present support, the shares held by the minor parties 
will increase and that of the major parties decrease. In all likelihood, a single 
party will be unable to command a majority of seats and coalition governments 
will be necessary. 
If (constituency) MPs become more accountable to the electorate, there may be a 
tendency for party discipline and the whips system to decline as MPs become 
more mindful of the opinions of their constituency than the approval of the 
party machine. Such a development may make the achievement of the broad 
consensus needed to satisfy the strictures of section 268 more difficult than at 
present. This may result in a situation where legitimate demands for 
constitutional change remain unheeded or governments unable to secure the 
necessary majority may be tempted to ignore the convention and legislate in an 
ordinary manner. Indeed, the Justice Department commented in 1993 with 
reference to the Electoral Reform Bill that "[o]ne of the major difficulties in 
implementing the present reform process has arisen from the need to develop 
proposals which comply with the letter and spirit of section 189 of the Electoral 
Act."49 
However, even if it will become more difficult to achieve the necessary majority 
under MMP, the reserved provisions should still be protected if they are matters 
deserving of protection. One should not forgo safeguards on the integrity of our 
constitution solely by reason of legislative inconvenience. Indeed, one might 
suggest, based on the legislative history of electoral law, that legitimate demands 
for constitutional change which enjoy widespread public support will receive the 
48 
Above n 5, 78. 
40 
Above n 25, 80. 
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l 
necessary parliamentary endorsement. Bearing in mind the fundamental nature 
of the provisions, if a particular proposal cannot muster the support necessary to 
comply with section 268, then one may legitimately suggest that it should not be 
passed at all. 
Loss of Parliament's power by entrenching section 268. 
Since the passing of the Electoral Act 1956, any changes which have been made 
to the reserved provisions, have in fact been made in compliance with section 
189. This is the position even though there was no legal requirement on 
Parliament to comply with them. For forty years, Parliament has demonstrated 
that despite these restrictions, it has nevertheless been possible to muster the 
requisite majority to pass legislation complying with the provisions of section 
189. 
One could argue that this demonstrates that the political sanctions hoped for in 
1955 now exist and do in fact function efficaciously. It is now politically 
unacceptable for any of the matters reserved by section 189 to be amended other 
than in conformity with that provision. As the political sanctions achieve the 
desired result, there is no need to engage in novel constitutional developments to 
achieve a result which is already available within the present constitutional 
system. So many of our constitutional safeguards already rest solely upon 
constitutional conventions. It is not necessary to genuinely entrench the 
provisions to safeguard the matters covered. 
However, this complacency, and indeed the convention itself, may not survive in 
a more diverse Parliament likely to result under MMP. In any respect, that 
Parliament has been able to comply with section 189 may be used to argue that it 
should be genuinely entrenched. Political convention now dictates that the 
matters reserved by section 268 only be amended in compliance with section 268. 
There will therefore be no real loss of power to Parliament were the provisions to 
be given effect. Doubly entrenching section 268 will merely affirm the status quo. 
In addition, it will remove the matters in section 268 from the danger of being 
z 
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amended by the ordinary procedure to suit the whims of a transitory 
parliamentary majority. 
The substance of this argument is that genuinely entrenching section 268 will 
involve no real loss of power to parliament. Given this, and given that 
entrenchment would preserve the fundamental elements of our political system 
from amendment or repeal by a transient parliamentary majority, there seems no 
reason why we should not entrench section 268. 
}. Other provisions deserving the protection ef section 268. 
1. Provisions tn the Electoral Act 1993 
(a) Electoral Commission 
Part I of the Electoral Act 1993 establishes and regulates the Electoral 
Commission. The Electoral Commission is charged with three functions. 
Firstly, to register political parties; secondly, to promote public awareness of the 
electoral system, an awareness which is at present woefully inadequate; and 
thirdly to consider electoral matters referred by the Minister or the House of 
Representatives. 
Although all these functions are important, the registration of political parties is 
crncial to the effective functioning of MMP. Half the seats are allocated to party 
lists, and only registered political parties will be eligible for those seats. It is 
essential that the Electoral Commission retain this function, and the requisite 
powers and resources to carry it out without political interference. 
Sections 5-8 and 10-11, at least, should be accorded the protection of section 268 
to preserve the Commission's ability to carry out its functions impartially. 
(b) Political Parties 
Part N of the Act relates to the registration of political parties, a function carried 
out by the Electoral Commission. However, it is desirable that the conditions 
governing the registration of parties, and the conditions under which the 
z 
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Commission can decline to register a political party be protected from political 
manipulation. 
Sections 63 and 66 should therefore be covered by section 268. 
(c) Maori electors 
It is with some surprise that it is noted that although section 268 protects non-
Maori electors and the division of electoral districts, no such protection is 
accorded to the Maori roll. 
The Royal Commission of the Electoral System recommended that the Maori 
option be abolished if MMP were adopted, as they felt that MMP would provide 
"optimal conditions for the effective representation of Maori interests."~0 The 
original proposal in the Electoral Reform Bill was for the abolition of the four 
Maori seats, but for the waiver of the 50/o threshold for Maori parties. However, 
the Electoral Act 1993 provides for a variable number of Maori seats and retains 
the 5% threshold. 51 
In a political system which professes the importance of protecting minority 
interests, by such devices as the Bill of Rights Act 1990, and which recognises the 
special position enjoyed by Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi, the importance 
of the Maori seats cannot be denied:52 
The existence of the seats guarantees there will be members of Parliament who 
directly represent the interests of Maori people in a national forum where their 
voices can be heard on matters of particular import,111ce to those they represent. 
They are directly elected by those people, and are accountable to them. While the 
seats may have been established for reasons of expediency, they have nevertheless 
been of value in ensuring that the political interests of the Maori people were kept 
before Parliament, especially during the periods when Maori numbers were too 
small or non-Maori attitudes too unsympathetic for Maori to have been elected 
from within the general electoral system. 
50 
Above n 1, 113. 
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lhc m,1in objections to the origin,11 propos,11 were ensuring ,1 rnntinuctl Maori reprcscntdtion in 
P.irli.imcnt .ind the tliffirnlty, ,1nd indeed the propriety, of the the C hief [lcttoral O flicer tletermining 
wh.it is or is not a politic.ii p<1rty "prim.irily repre5enting M.iori intcrc\ls." 
Sl 
Above n 1, 89. 
z 
-----------------,----~---, • .-.ru&-a , i~--xivi---•a---- --------------
Folder William 
..,___~----------- Lo Tnw.ca,..rlc 0 'ho++.a.-
7'011. IRD5 . I Br nm DLltoCR.1(1' 21 
Regardless of the constih1tional arguments for the preservation of the Maori 
option, while it exists there is little reason not to afford the Maori option the 
protection afforded to the general option. For instance, as the number of Maori 
electorates now varies according to the number of persons on the Maori roll, 
governments may be tempted to redefine either the electoral districts or the 
requirements for registration on the Maori roll, in order to manipulate the 
composition of Parliament. Even more seriously, there is no impediment to a 
government which resolves to abolish the Maori option entirely. These dangers 
are not present for the general option, and it is time this anomaly was removed. 
Both the integrity and the existence of the system should be protected. Section 
268 should therefore be extended to cover sections 45 and 76-78. 
2. Bill of Rights Act 1990 
When a Bill of Rights was originally proposed in 1985, it was to have been 
doubly entrenched. Largely due to the spectre of unelected judges overruling Acts 
of c1n elected Parliament, when the Bill became law in 1990, it did so as a piece of 
ordinary legislation. Indeed, section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act states that other 
enactments passed before or after the Bill of Rights Act will not be affected by 
this Act. Noting that even implied repeal of earlier legislation is precluded, the 
intended limited effect of the Bill of Rights Act is apparent. 
However, sections 5 and 6 of the Bill of Rights Act provide avenues which have 
been used by the courts to interpret other enactments to give the fullest effect 
possible to the rights contained in the Bill of Rights Act.53 Considerable effect 
has therefore been given to the Bill of Rights Act despite the constraints of 
section 4; largely due to the fact that it implements international standards of 
human rights. Indeed, some may suggest that the practical impact of the Bill of 
Rights Act is virtually as if it were doubly entrenched. 
However, the Bill of Rights Act remains vulnerable. Given that the missive in 
section 4 has had little effect in restraining the courts from giving effect to the 
cc for imt,rncc Po/ire v O'Connor 11992] 1 NZLR 87; R. V Butrher and Burgess 11991 I 2 NZ! R 257 (CA); 
Noori v Ministry of Transport, Curran v Pol,ce 11990-19921 1 NZBORR 97; R. V Goodwin lJnrcportc<l, Court 
of Appc,11, CA 460/91, 25 November 1992. 
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rights contained in the Bill of Rights Act, the obvious avenue open to a 
government is to amend the provisions of the Act itself. An ordinary 
parliamentary majority unwilling to trnst the effect of section 4 could amend the 
substance of the rights contained in the Act to avoid an undesirable judicial 
result. 
One must question the ability of political sanctions to prevent the amendment of 
the Bill of Rights Act in such a manner. Governments over the last ten years 
have demonstrated a willingness to do politically unpopular things. The effect of 
MMP remains to be seen. Although the lack of a secure majority in the 
Government caucus may increase Ministerial accountability to Parliament, one 
may argue whether the likelihood of coalition governments under MMP will 
blur the lines of accountability viz ti v1z the electorate and thus allow politicians 
to avoid accepting culpability for actions. 
Protecting the Bill of Rights Act against amendment or repeal other than by the 
means prescribed in section 268 of Electoral Act 1993 will not enable judges to 
set aside Acts of Parliament solely by reason of their inconsistency with the Bill 
of Rights Act, but would prevent a parliamentary majority amending the Bill of 
Rights Act to reduce the scope of the rights contained therein. This would avoid 
the spectre of unrestrained judicial activism, but would protect the substance of 
the rights against political encroachment. 
Enabling the Bill of Rights Act to override other Acts of Parliament is not 
necessary, as the courts have demonstrated an ability to apply the Bill of Rights 
Act in spite of the absence of an overriding power. It is more important to 
ensure that the scope of the rights contained in the Act cannot be altered other 
than with broad public consent. 
3. Constitution Act 1986 
Similar arguments could be made for the entrenchment of the Constitution Act 
1986. Presently only section 17(1), setting the maximum term of Parliament, is 
protected by section 268 of the Electoral Act 1993. The other provisions of the 
Act are subject to the ordinary parliamentary process. The Act was not 
7.. 
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entrenched in 1986 owing to residual doubts among some parliamentarians on 
the validity of entrenchment, and a desire not to frustrate the enactment of a Bill 
of Rights.'i4 
The Constitution Act 1986 brings together "the principal pieces of statutory 
constitutional law applicable to New Zealand as a fairly coherent whole 
containing much of what a 'written' constitution would provide."~~ Given that 
procedural entrenchment is now recognised as valid, the fundamental elements of 
our constitution should be removed from the political arena. Entrenching the 
Constitution Act 1986 would protect the basic features of responsible 
government, Parliamentary democracy and judicial independence. Even in 1986, 
it would have been possible to get unanimous agreement for the Act/6 
protection should therefore be afforded to the Act to preclude its amendment or 
repeal other than by similar support. 
However, entrenching the Constitution Act 1986 at this time would open a 
perhaps unhelpful constitutional debate at a time when we are already 
undergoing a significant constitutional realignment. For instance, entrenching 
the Act would inevitably bring the republican debate to the fore, as the from of 
Head of State is specified in section 2 of the Act. For the moment, it is perhaps 
better to devote our attention to implementing the new electoral system. 
Res Publica 
The more diverse Parliaments likely to result under MMP may involve some shift 
of power to the Governor-General. Although the essential constitutional 
conventions of responsible government are unlikely to be displaced, their 
operation may become uncertain. For instance, while Ministers must still be able 
to command the support of a majority in Parliament, "the Governor-General 
may be left in some doubt as to who is [sic] his or her responsible advisers and 
may have to exercise reserve powers, powers which have not been exercised in 
Yi C P.tmlcr New 7.1:aland's Constitutwn m Crms Qohn MdnJoc, DuncJin, 1992), .50. 
~
5 
Dcp.utmcnt of Ju~ticc Reports ofan Officials Commrllee on Comt1tut10na/ Rrjimn: Second Report (1986), para 
1.7. 
·
10 
Above n 54, .50. 
LAW LIBRARY 
llCTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINOT 
- ---------------,-----~-c~ ;gn, 
Folder William 
-..,. _ __..-----------~ J.n Tnw.,.,..n c "" 'ho++ ...... 
1'011, /Rl)!; . 1 /3/rtLR DL110CR.1(T 24 
New Zealand in modern times." 57 The adoption of MMP may occasion more 
frequent exercises of the reserve powers. 
One could validly question whether it is still acceptable for the British monarch, 
who happens also to be New Zealand's monarch, to, on occasion, exercise real 
political power in New Zealand today. The same question could be raised about 
her appointed representative. This may lead one to suggest replacing the 
monarchy with an elected Head of State. 
However, the Republican debate is a considerable one, and one which is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Although I do not want to enter this debate, a brief 
comment is necessary given that this paper advocates entrenching the 
fundamental elements of our political system. 
Concerns about the Queen's direct influence on our political system can be 
largely dispensed with. When reserve powers have been exercised in the 
Commonwealth, the powers have been exercised by the Sovereign's representative, 
and not by the Sovereign herself. It is therefore extremely unlikely that if the 
exercise of reserve powers was necessary, this would be done by the Q.1een. The 
reserve powers would be exercised by the Governor-General. 
However, one may object to the unelected nature of the vice-regal office. If the 
Head of State is to enjoy real political power, then the position should be an 
elected one, with the holder accountable to the people of New Zealand for 
his/her actions. Ad captandum vulgus arguments for Republicanism based solely 
on maturing as a nation and discarding colonial shackles fail to appreciate the 
fact that much power in this country resides in unelected officers: 58 
[S]uch rnles [011 the exercise of resen1e pawers] stem from a purely representative 
view of the constitution, in which the Governor-General should not have discretion 
because she has no democratic credentials. But our constitution is not a purely 
representative one. We do not elect police chiefs, judges, or dog-catchers. 
51 
M C hen "Remedying New Ze,il,rnd\ Comtituti on in Crisis: Is MMP part of the ,rnswer?" (1993) New 
/.ea/and Law Journal 22, 32 . 
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R Robertso n "MMP threatens Covernor-(,cner;il's powers" lht.: Dominion, Wellington, New Ze.il;ind, 3 
August 1994, 6. 
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To one who believes in responsible government there 1s nothing incongruous in 
the monarch or her representative having the power to appoint the Prime Minister. 
As a trustworthy person above the political fray she is ideally suited to the task. 
This statement also highlights the need that the reserve powers be exercised in an 
impartial way, and not subject to political bias. An elected Head of State would 
inevitably become politicised:59 
[A] new set of rnles would have to be devised to decide who would be Head of 
State. At this point in our history the office would almost certainly be an elective 
one. And there would be a real danger that the office would be the subject of 
political contest between the parties. 
Appointments to the office of Governor-General, made on the advice of the New 
Zealand Government, have not been overtly political, and incumbents have 
maintained a strict impartiality. When a genuine discretion is attached to the 
office, it is essential that the reserve powers be exercised in such a way as to give 
effect to the democratic will of the people. These powers should not be used to 
manipulate or subvert the will of the people expressed in a general election. 
Although by no means perfect, the continuation of the present system is less 
likely to result in the politicisation of the office that an elective office. 
It may nevertheless be objected that appointing the Governor-General on the 
advice of the Government of the day allows this Government to recommend a 
person designed to secure its future political fortunes. While the history of the 
office does not substantiate such fears, one could adopt a practice of appointing 
the Governor-General on the advice of the House of Representatives, as are the 
Auditor and Comptroller-General and the Ombudsmen. 
Conclusion 
At the last resort, our entire political system is currently at the whim of an 
ordinary parliamentary majority. It is desirable that those matters most 
fundamental to our system of government be protected so as to ensure that 
change occurs only with widespread public support. 
\
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60 
The validity of entrenchment is today beyond question. The European 
Community litigation in the United Kingdom marks the victory of the self-
embracing school of parliamentary sovereignty and the acceptance of procedural 
restrictions on parliament's law-making powers. As the sovereignty of our 
parliament is measured against that of Westminster, it would be absurd to 
suggest that procedural restrictions are not possible in New Zealand. 
However, although procedural restrictions may be shown to be valid, one must 
still demonstrate their necessity in a particular instance. I would submit that the 
imperative in this instance can be found in the lack of adequate safeguards 
presently existing for the fundamental elements of our constitutional system. 
Although these elements have never enjoyed protection, the adoption of MMP 
provides an opportune time to protect these essential matters. We are already 
undergoing major constitutional change and creating a truly New Zealand 
political system. Echoing P A Joseph, one can only argue that as we redefine our 
constitution, it is time to protect the essential elements of our democracy:60 
One ponders why Parliament did not squarely seize the opportunity for double 
entrenchment under the new Act - for entrenchment of section 268 itself ,md 
protecting it from simple repeal. Single entrenchment under section 189 was an 
awkward compromise for accommodating Diceyan orthodoxy, but that compromise 
expended its purpose as soon as Governments and lawyers accepted that section 189 
was binding. The MMP referendum also held out hope of popular support for 
double entrenchment. Popular endorsement might have vouchsafed the 
entrenchment and given the Courts confidence in a crisis, that they might stand 
resolute against a hostile Government. Without double entrenchment, MMP must 
rely, like its predecessor (FPP), on ordinary political disincentives against tampering 
with the electoral system. 
J\lxlv~ n 5, 81. 
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